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I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 12, 2001, the world woke up a different place. In New York, the dust had
not yet settled from the World Trade Center Towers, the fires still burned within the massive
mountain of twisted steel, as the world watched the horrific events unfold again and again on
news stations around the world. The United States had been the victim of international
terrorism. Not since a Sunday in December 1941, had the United States been attacked through
the air on its own soil by foreign enemies. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men, by the order
of Osama bin Laden, leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, hijacked four U.S.
commercial airliners bound for Los Angeles and used the planes as missiles. Within minutes,
two planes hit the north and south towers at the World Trade Center complex just as people were
getting to work. Moments later a plane slammed into the Pentagon in northern Virginia. A
plane hijacked over Cleveland turned and headed towards Washington D.C., but the heroic
passengers commandeered the plane and it plummeted into a field in Pennsylvania. By
lunchtime Eastern Standard Time, 3,025 innocent people needlessly lost their lives. After the
horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States’ “war on terrorism” had commenced.
As the initial shock began to fade, bringing the persons responsible to justice became the focus
of the United States as well as the feeling throughout the international community. Osama bin
Laden and other high ranking Al Qaeda officials were blamed for planning, funding and
executing the attacks on the United States.
The United States and the rest of the world undoubtedly have an interest in administering
justice to Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al Qaeda members for the attacks on the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania in route to another
target. George W. Bush stated in a speech to a joint session of Congress, “'[w]hether we bring
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our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”1 The United Nations
also condemned the terrorist attacks and vowed its support in pursuing and punishing terrorists.2
Various forums have been suggested as appropriate to bring Osama bin Laden and other Al
Qaeda terrorists to justice. Some propose a trial in an international tribunal, such as the ones created by
the United Nations for the atrocities committed in Rwanda3 and the former Yugoslavia, or even in the
International Criminal Court in the initial stages of development.4 Others have suggested allowing the
United States to try members of Al Qaeda in U.S. Federal District Courts; while President George W.
Bush and his administration call for trial by a U.S. Military Tribunal.5 All proposed forums raise
numerous issues and concerns. With all the tribunals there are questions of whether jurisdiction is
appropriate. Trying terrorists responsible for the attacks in the United States District Courts or by U.S.
military commissions raise concerns of whether extradition would be possible if the terrorists were
apprehended in another country.

Where to try persons accused of international terrorism acts, more specifically, where to try
Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda members when they are finally apprehended? This note
focuses on the requirements for jurisdiction of a few proposed forums, and the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed forums. Part II defines and applies the five recognized general
principles of international jurisdiction to the proposed forums. Part III focuses on the
jurisdiction of, advantages and disadvantages of United States Federal District Courts. Part IV
discuses the jurisdiction of, advantages and disadvantages of the proposed use of United States
Military Commissions. Part V of this note addresses the problems with extradition of captured
terrorists. Part VI focuses on proposed international tribunals including: the tribunal created by
1

See George W. Bush, Speech on September 20, 2001 concerning the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
available at http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushSpeech.htm.
2
See G.A. Res 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001). The United Nations Security
Council on September 12, 2001 condemned the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania as a
“threat to international peace and security,” a violation of the U.N. Charter. [hereinafter Resolution 1368].
3
See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
4
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
5
Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non- Citizens in the War Against Terrorism §
2(A)(1)(i)-(iii), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
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the United Nations for the atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the
International Criminal Court in its initial stage of development. Part VII concludes by finding
the appropriate forum to administer justice to Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists for
the atrocities of September 11, is to try the captured in the countries in which they are
apprehended.
II.
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION

General Principles of International Law: Defined
International law recognizes five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction: Territorial,

National, Protective, Universal, and Passive Personal.6 Territorial principle is satisfied when the
crime takes place on a state’s soil.7 If a national of a state commits an act, then that state has
proper extraterritorial jurisdiction.8 The protective principle is based on the injury to a national
interest.9 For crimes that are so atrocious, any territory that has custody of the offender can
exercise jurisdiction for that act; this is the universal principle.10 The passive personal principle
of extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim.11 The basis surrounding
these five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the notion of state sovereignty.12 The
ability of a state to control conduct occurring within its territory, to protect its interests, and
control its nationals and attach consequences to certain acts all relate to sovereignty.13

6

See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940
F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 402, 404 (1987); Harvard
Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435 (Supp. 1935)
7
Id. See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(a) (“conduct that, wholly or in substantial part,
takes place within its territory;” a state has jurisdiction over the offense).
8
Id.
9
Id. See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(c) (1987) (“conduct outside its territory that has or
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory”).
10
Id. See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (“A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe
punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even
where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present”).
11
Id.
12
See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 6.
13
Id.
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B.

Application of General Principles
When the acts of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members involved in the

September 11 attacks are applied to these principles, international jurisdiction appears to be
satisfied. The attacks took place in the territory of the United States; thus, the universally
accepted principle of territorial principle is satisfied and the U.S. courts would have valid
jurisdiction based on this principle. The national principle when applied would concede
recognized jurisdiction to where the offender is a national. In the case of bin Laden, he was
originally a national of Saudi Arabia, however, his citizenship has been revoked and he was
exiled.14 Thus, it does not appear that bin Laden is a national of any country, however a case
could be made for Saudi Arabia having jurisdiction based on the national principle. The attacks
on September 11 undoubtedly injured the United States interest, home and abroad; thus, U.S.
jurisdiction would most likely be satisfied by the protective principle. However, ninety-one
different countries had nationals who died on September 11.15 As to each country that had
nationals perish in the attacks, the degree of interests injured would have to be measured to
determine proper jurisdiction under the protective principle. If the interests injured were severe,
jurisdiction may be proper in any of the ninety-one countries.
The universal principle poses interesting quandaries. It is safe to say that the multiple
hijackings of U.S. commercial airliners and using them as missiles, killing more than 3,000
persons in a matter of minutes would be considered an atrocious crime. Many past international
agreements have failed to suppress terrorism because of the inability to define precisely what is

14

See A Private Terrorist, Osama Bin Laden: Folk Hero, Pariah, Terrorist Kingpin, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/binladen_profile.html (Bin Laden was exiled from Saudi Arabia
in 1994 for his activated towards the royal family as well as alleged terrorists activities, he traveled to Sudan and
disappeared).
15
See Bush, supra note 1. President Bush stated that we [United States] would not forget the citizens of eighty
different nations who died with our own. See also Porter Anderson, The ‘Great Struggle’: Consoling the Living,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/11/ar911.memorial.main/index.html.
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covered.16 Recent efforts in international law by treaties, conventions, or resolutions have
increased the acceptance of what crimes will be included in this principle.17 Crimes such as
piracy, genocide, war crimes, hostage taking18, and hijacking aircrafts19 are considered
universally atrocious where there is a common international goal to suppress such acts. Most of
the conventions and agreements require that a state make specific terrorist acts punishable by
domestic laws and that an offender found in that state’s territory would either be tried under its
laws or extradited to a country that has jurisdiction.20
The universal principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction would give rise to jurisdiction in
many different countries. The countries that are parties to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hijacking Convention”) (175 parties), and the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (“Hostage Convention”) (112 parties) would have
appropriate jurisdiction to try Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists involved in the
attacks.21 Osama bin Laden allegedly planned, ordered, and executed the hijackings of
September 11. The plan involved the hijacking of multiple U.S. commercial aircrafts, a violation
of the Hijacking Convention, which would also violate the Hostage Convention because the
hijackers took hostages before the plan was fully executed. Both of these conventions calls for
the immediate punishment of the offenders in the country apprehended or extradition to a
country that has appropriate jurisdiction. Thus, under international law, the attacks would be
16

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 cmt. a. (1987).
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Concluded at Strasbourg, 27 January 1977. Entered into
force, 4 August 1978. 1137 U.N.T.S. 93. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Concluded at New York, 14 December 1973.
Entered into force, 20 February 1977. 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, Conclude at New York, 17 December 1979. Entered into force, 3 June 1983. 1316 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Hostage Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Concluded
at New York, 12 January 1998. Entered into force, 23 May 2001. Doc. A/RES/52/164; International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism, Concluded at New York, 9 December 1999. Entered into force,
10 April 2002. Resolution A/RES/54/109; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Concluded at Hague, 16 December 1970. Entered into force 14 October 1971. 860 UNTS 105 [hereinafter
Hijacking Convention].
18
See Hostage Convention, supra note 17, Article 1.
19
Id.
20
See Conventions, supra note 17.
21
Id.
17
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considered a universal crime and therefore, any country that apprehends Osama bin Laden and
other Al Qaeda terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks could try them under the universal
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The final extraterritorial principle recognized in international law is the passive principle.
The United States could base jurisdiction on this principle because most of who died on
September 11 were nationals of the U.S. However, 91 other countries lost nationals to the
attacks; each of which would, arguably, have jurisdiction based on the protective principle. The
protective principle is not universally recognized in international law. The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations states: “[t]he [protective] principle has not been generally accepted for
ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized
attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's
diplomatic representatives or other officials.”22 Hence, the protective principle of extraterritorial
jurisdiction would be appropriate over Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists involved
in the attacks.
III.
A.

UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRCIT COURTS

JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
The United States District Courts (“U.S. courts”) would have internationally recognized

jurisdiction under four of the five principles established in international law. The attacks in New
York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on September 11 all took place in the United States; thus,
the territorial principle is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the U.S. courts. There is little doubt
that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 caused severe injury to an interest of the United States. The
U.S. has an international right to protect its interests home and abroad. Such an injury to a
substantial U.S. interest a U.S. interest would confer jurisdiction under the protective principle.
The United States also has an interest in protecting its Nationals. Over 3000 U.S. Nationals died,

22

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 cmt. g.
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thus satisfying the passive principle. Crimes of terrorism are considered universal crimes, for
which any country has jurisdiction to prosecute the terrorist, including the United States. Thus,
the universal principle is satisfied. The protective and universal principles are controversial and
not recognized by everyone in the international community.
In United States v. Yunis, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit was faced with the problem of whether the protective and universal principles were a
proper excise of personal jurisdiction over a hijacker.23 In 1985, Yunis and four other men
boarded Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402.24 Shortly before the take-off the men hijacked the
plane.25 Among the passengers were two American citizens who were tied up with the rest of the
people on board.26 After several attempts to fly to different locations, the plane ended up in
Beirut.27 The hijackers released the passengers, held a press conference, blew up the plane and
fled.28 The Federal Bureau of Investigation lured Yunis on a boat for an alleged drug deal,
where he was detained as soon as the boat reached international waters.29 Yunis appealed his
conviction claiming the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction.30
The court held the Hostage Taking Act31, which Yunis was convicted under, was not in
conflict with international law.32 It noted that the U.S. Hostage Taking Act was enacted to
execute the Convention Against Taking of Hostages33, under which a party state can exercise
jurisdiction over persons who take nationals hostage “if that state considers it appropriate.”34
The court next discussed the five generally recognized principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction

23

United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d. 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1089.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1090.
31
See U.S.C. § 1203. Hostage Taking Act.
32
Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090.
33
See Hostage Convention, supra note 17.
34
Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090.
24
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and concluded that the protective and universal principles were satisfied.35 Further the court
explained that the job of the judicial system is to abide by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States, “not to conform the laws of the land to norms of customary international
law.”36 The court stated in regards to the universal and protective principles, “Aircraft hijacking
may well be one of the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may
assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the state has no territorial
connection to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved.”37 United States courts have
allowed the extraterritorial use of penal laws based on any one of the five principles of
extraterritoriality.38
The United States by statute has specially conferred jurisdiction to the U.S. courts for
particular crimes. For example, under the crime of Aircraft Piracy, 49 U.S.C § 4650239, the
statute proclaims there is jurisdiction over the crime of aircraft piracy if40 “a national of the
United States was aboard the aircraft41; an offender is a national of the United States42; or an
offender is afterwards found in the United States.”43 By adding this section on jurisdiction
Congress has instilled the protective, national, and territorial principles found under international
law. Even where the intent of Congress is vague, it does not negate jurisdiction. “[U.S.] courts
will not blind themselves to potential violations of international law where legislative intent is
ambiguous.”44 Therefore, if the statute explicitly confers jurisdiction there is little problem, but
even where it is not expressly stated, a U.S. court can find jurisdiction over certain offenses.

35

Id. at 1091.
Id.
37
Id. at 1092.
38
Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1312.
39
49 U.S.C. § 46502 (1996).
40
49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2).
41
49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2)(A).
42
49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2)(B).
43
49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2)(C).
44
See Yunis, 924 F.2d. at 1091.
36
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B.

Offenses Available In United States District Courts
If Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda members were tried in the U.S. courts, what offenses

could be tried? The United States could prosecute for international violations of the law of
nations, more specifically war crimes, and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.45
The United States has enacted a wide array of federal antiterrorism acts. For example, Zacarias
Moussaoui,46 a French nationalist, has been charged in the Untied States District Court with acts
connected with the September 11 terrorist attacks. Specifically, Moussaoui was charged in
United States District Court with Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism Transcending
National Boundaries47; Conspiracy to Commit Aircraft Piracy48; Conspiracy to Destroy
Aircraft49; Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction50; Conspiracy to Murder United
States Employees51; and Conspiracy to Destroy Property.52 There is a considerable amount of
antiterrorism legislation at the U.S. court’s disposal, with even more proposed in response to the
attacks of September 11.
C.

Advantages: United States District Courts
There are several advantages to prosecuting Osama bin Laden in U.S. courts. The United

States has countless antiterrorism legislation at the prosecutor’s discretion; thus, finding crimes
that would lead to justice being served would be easier found. The international community
would be more willing to accept a decision in the U.S. courts, as opposed to a secret military
tribunal headed by the United States. Countries may be more willing to extradite to U.S. civilian
courts rather than a military commission. In the U.S. courts, due process guarantees would be
afforded to the suspects; even to the likes of bin Laden. U.S. courts have broad powers to protect
45

See 18 U.S.C. §2441 (2000); see, e.g., Regulations on the Law and Customs of War on Land, Art. 25, annex to
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
46
Indictment of Zacaria Moussaoui, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm.
47
18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(a)(2) & (c).
48
49 U.S.C. §§ 46502(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(B).
49
18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(7) & 34.
50
18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a).
51
18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1117.
52
18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f), (i), (n).
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information, witnesses, informants, judges, jurors, and those involved in the judicial process.53
“[T]he use of prosecutorial techniques developed in fighting organized crime has taught
prosecutors that they can get testimony in return for deals with low ranking members of a
conspiracy, and that putting defendants on trial together gives a great ability to show jurors the
full extent of the criminal organization.”54
D.

Disadvantages: United States District Courts
Prosecuting Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists in U.S. courts has various

disadvantages. Unlike the military commissions, there are strict rules of evidence which act to
limit what can be presented in U.S. courts. The court proceedings would be conducted in an
open forum and the record would be public. This is especially a concern of the intelligence
agencies because there is classified information that may be beneficial to Al Qaeda that would be
easily accessible. However, there is the 1980 Classified Information Procedures Act that
provides rules on sensitive information at trial, but the proceedings are nonetheless public.55
Besides classified information, there is other useful information that may come to fruition by
trial in an open forum.

For example, “[p]ublications, as took place in the 1993 World Trade

Center bombing, of existence engineering data on the construction of the towers; such
information is public but not easy to obtain, unless, for example, it is brought into open court in a
trial.”56 There are concerns among the international community as to whether any terrorist
linked to the horrific acts of 9/11 could obtain a fair and impartial trial. It would be hard to
imagine finding a person to sit on a jury whose life was not affected in some way by the attacks.

53

Kenneth Anderson, What to do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified Defense of Military
Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
591, 607 (2002).
54
Id.
55
See Anderson, supra note 53, at 609.
56
Id.
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IV.
A.

UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Jurisdiction of United States Military Commissions
President George W. Bush and his administration have been adamant on prosecuting

apprehended terrorists in a military tribunal. On November 13, 2001, President Bush, as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States issued Military Order 57833
titled Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
(“Military Order”).57 The Military Order proclaims in order “[t]o protect the United States and
its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist
attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order … be detained, and, when tried, to be
tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”58
Individuals subject to this order are non-U.S. citizens who are or were a member of Al Qaeda59,
or has “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism60…”
and finally, anyone who provides safe haven to either of the former.61 On March 22, 2002, the
Defense Department issued its Military Commissions Order No.1, Procedures For Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
(“Order 1”), which clarifies the President’s Military Order. Order 1 expounds on President
Bush’s Military Order by stating the rules of evidence, the defendants choice of counsel,
defendant’s right to have a public proceeding, unless the presiding officer deems it at odds with
the Military Order, and the minimal due process guarantees.62

57

See Military Order, supra note 5.
Military Order(e), supra note 5.
59
Military Order(2)(a)(1)(i), supra note 5.
60
Military Order(2)(a)(1)(ii), supra note 5.
61
Military Order(2)(a)(1)(iii), supra note 5.
62
U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of
Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf
58
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International law recognizes the use of military courts to adjudicate prisoners during
armed conflict.63 Article 84 of the third Geneva Convention states that, "[a] prisoner of war shall
be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly
permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of
the particular offense."64 Court-martials are a permissible forum to prosecute prisoners of war
under United Stated law as well; however, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UMCJ”)65
limits personal jurisdiction to U.S. military personnel66, prisoners of war67, and a restricted class
of civilians.68 The legal basis for the creation of military commissions in the United States is
vested in Congress’ constitutional power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations; Congress has conferred the creation of military tribunals to the executive branch.69
In Ex parte Quirin70, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether the creation of military commissions by executive order, was within the scope of the
President’s power granted by statute or the Constitution of the United States, and whether the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments would allow trial by jury. Ex parte Quirin was a case involving
alleged German saboteurs who received training in Germany, under the cover of darkness,
waded ashore in Florida from a German submarine back into the United States with the intent on
destroying war industries and war installations.71 All the men involved were taken into custody
in New York and Chicago.72 Pursuant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Military Order 5103,

63

Michael J. Matheson, U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several Options, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 354 (2002).
Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War. Concluded at Geneva, 12
August 1949. Entered into force, 21 October 1950. 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
65
10 U.S.C. §§ 801-948 (2000), the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be found in the Manual for Courts-Martial
United States (2000), available at http:\\www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm2000.pdf.
66
See 10 U.S.C. § 801(2)(1).
67
See 10 U.S.C. § 801(2)(9).
68
See 10 U.S.C.§ 801(2)(10)-(11); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000). See also Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military
Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 320, 321 (2002).
69
Mundis, supra note 68, at 321.
70
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) [hereinafter Quirin].
71
Id. at 8-9.
72
Id.
64
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July 2, 194273, all saboteurs were prosecuted in a military tribunal for violations of the laws of
war74, Article 81, 82 of the Articles of war, and conspiracy to commit the alleged offenses.75
The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he Constitution thus invests the President as
Commander in Chief with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into
effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation
of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing [offenses] against the law of nations,
including those which pertain to the conduct of war.”76 Congress has provided the rules and
regulations of the Armed Forces under the Articles of War.77 “Congress has explicitly
provided…that military tribunals shall have appropriate jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the laws of war...”78 When [President Roosevelt] issued the Executive Order proclaiming
the use of military tribunals, the President was exercising the power conferred to him by
Congress.79 The court held that the President is authorized to order combatants tried in a military
commission for violation of the law of war, and such an order is lawful exercise of his powers.80
The Supreme Court was left to determine whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to
prosecutions in a military tribunal. “[T]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever
authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military
commission, and that petitioners charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at
common law, were lawfully placed on trial by Commission without a jury.”81 Consequently,
those tried in military tribunals for violations of the law of war do not have the right to request a
jury by its peers.

73

President’s Proclamation No. 2561.
Law of war is embodied in the law of nations. The law of nations is based on natural law and proscribes how
nations are to act towards other nations, available at http://www.pixi.com/~kingdom/lawintro.html.
75
Quirin supra note 70, at 8.
76
Id. at 10.
77
Id. See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (2000).
78
Id.
79
Quirin supra note 70, at 11.
80
Id. at 20.
81
Id. at 19.
74
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The Military Order issued by President Bush is similar to the order given by Franklin D.
Roosevelt (“FDR”), which was at controversy in Ex parte Quirin.82 The Supreme Court upheld
FDR’s order as a constitutionally valid exercise of the President’s power. If President Bush’s
Military Order were challenged, the same arguments would be trotted out in front of the Supreme
Court. However, Bush’s Military Order is distinguishable from Roosevelt’s order. When
President Roosevelt issued his Military Order, the United States was entrenched in the Second
World War. When the attacks of September 11 occurred, the U.S. was not at war. However, it
can be argued that the United States is now entrenched in a “war on terrorism,” and the Military
Order is necessary to effectuate the goal suppressing international terrorism. Even though it is
distinguishable, it appears that the Supreme Court would uphold President Bush’s Military Order
for the same reasons the court upheld FDR’s order in Ex parte Quirin. “Military commissions
are thus an accepted means of trying persons who commit offenses against the laws of war, such
as the deliberate targeting of civilians, abuse of prisoners, and failure of combatants to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population.”83
B.

Advantages: United States Military Commissions
There are many advantages to allowing Osama bin Laden and other members of the Al

Qaeda organization to be prosecuted in a U.S. military commission under President Bush’s
Military Order. The United States was the country most affected by the acts of terrorism; hence
it should have the right to administer justice to bin Laden. The military tribunals would not be
held in a public forum; consequently sensitive U.S. intelligence information gathered for the
fight against terrorism would not be exposed to the general public. The military commissions
would be a quick and efficient mechanism of justice because there is no jury and the process is
streamlined. The Military Order provides that the admission of evidence is at the discretion of
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the presiding officer of the military commission.84 Rules on hearsay would not be as stringent as
in the domestic courts of the United States, which would allow more evidence to be presented
and greater discretion to the judge in determining what will be entered as evidence. For
example, an alleged telephone call from Osama bin Laden to his mother stating that “something
big was imminent” shortly before the attacks on September 11 could be deemed admissible
under the military tribunals’ informal rules of evidence.85 The Military Order provides that
punishment will be administered in accordance with the law, including “life imprisonment and
death,” thus the punishment will be harsh.86
C.

Disadvantages: United States Military Commissions
The first disadvantage to the use of United States military commissions is a state that

apprehends an Al Qaeda member may block extradition to the U.S. because of President Bush’s
Military Order. In November 2001, Spain officials arrested eight men allegedly belonging to the
Al Qaeda network.87 It has been reported that Spain may deny any extradition request based on
the condition of the death row prisons in the United States.88 Spain asserts that the “Bush
administration’s plan to try suspected foreign terrorists in military courts, which would arguably
violate the guarantee of an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’ as provided for in Article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“European Convention on Human Rights”).”89 Consequently, extradition from a state party to
the European Convention may block extradition to the United States based on the nature of the
military commissions alone, let alone any objections to capital punishment. President Bush in
the Military Order did not exclude the use of capital punishment. If the United States requests
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extradition of an Al Qaeda terrorist, European countries may be reluctant to extradite to the U.S.
because there is a chance the suspect would face the death penalty. Consequenty, President
Bush’s plan to try non U.S. Al Qaeda terrorists in a military commission without outlawing the
death penalty as a possible punishment may prove to be an insurmountable hurdle to extradition.
The next flaw in the use of U.S. military commissions is what is the status of the
suspected terrorist. Is a detainee considered a prisoner of war (“POW”) under the Third Geneva
Convention (“Geneva Convention III”)?90 Article four of the Geneva Convention III defines in
part the POW’s include persons “who have fallen into the hands of the enemy,” as:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b)
that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms
openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.91
The terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11 do not meet the POW
requirement under the Geneva Convention III because the terrorists failed to conduct “their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war92” when they used “civilians as both
the means and targets of their attacks93….” In addition, the terrorists did not carry arms openly
and had no “fixed distinctive sign recogniz[able].” The consequence is that POWs under the
Geneva Convention III are entitled to due process protections.94 In essence, if a detainee
qualifies as a POW under the Geneva Convention III, then the country prosecuting the POW
would have to provide the same safeguards as if it was trying one of its own military personnel.95
The procedures to try U.S. military personnel are found under the Uniform Code of Military

90

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Concluded at Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Entered into force, 21 October 1950. 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
91
Id., Art. 4(A)(2)(a)-(d). See also Anderson, supra note 53, at 614-15.
92
Id., Art. 4(A)(2)(d).
93
Anderson, supra note 53, at 616.
94
See Third Geneva Convention,supra note 90, Arts. 99-108; see also Anderson, supra note 58.
95
See Anderson, supra note 53, at 616.

17

Justice96, and afford virtually the same constitutional protections as the United States civilian
courts.97 The purpose of President Bush’s Military Order would be negated if international
terrorists were to gain all the due process protections granted by the United States Constitution.98
The international community may not believe that a trial in United States military
commissions is an impartial forum; thus, the alleged terrorist would not receive a fair trial. This
is reiterated by the fact that the Military Order does not provide Fifth or Sixth Amendment
protections. The Constitutional rights guaranteed to the alleged suspects are a miniscule basket
of rights. The Military Order only guarantees “a full and fair trial, with which the military
commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law.”99 A panel of three presiding officers will
act as the judge, jury, and ultimately decide fate of the suspects. By the United States creating
secret military tribunals to try non-citizens, then that would create a precedent allowing other
countries to create secret tribunals with limited due process guarantees. Use of military tribunals
to try suspects who most likely will be of the Muslim faith, would create a belief that the U.S. is
on a “crusade to kill, massacre, and eradicate Muslims.”100 Finally, a decision rendered by a
military commission created by the United States would not be given full credit under
international law. It is unlikely that the world would accept the punishment administered by the
commissions.
IV.

Extradition: Hurdle Thwarting United States Pursuit for Justice

There is little doubt that the United States has jurisdiction in either domestic courts or in
military commissions over Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al Qaeda terrorists for the
acts of September 11. However, a formidable challenge stands in the way of the U.S. exercising
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this power: extradition. If any of the wanted terrorists were apprehended in countries other than
the United States, then the U.S. would have to request extradition.
“Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or convicted of a crime against
the law of a state and found in a foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for trial or
punishment.”101 Extradition is based on fundamental principles of state sovereignty, more
specifically the notion that no state can violate another state’s territorial sovereignty to
apprehend a criminal without consent.102 Requesting and granting extradition by a state is not a
right, but is a discretionary power; in other words, a state is not under any legal obligation to
extradite unless there is a treaty to the contrary.103 In the United States, granting or requesting
extradition will only be done pursuant to a treaty.104 Treaties between two or more states today
govern most extraditions. These treaties usually provide that each state agrees reciprocally to
surrender offenders found in its territory to the state where the crime took place.105 Most
extradition treaties specifically define the offenses that can be extradited, any exceptions, and the
basic elements that must be met in order to extradite.106
Extradition treaties and state extradition laws usually require several elements that must
be satisfied before an extradition will be deemed proper under international law. First, the
criminal act must be prohibited in both the requesting state and the state where the offender is
present; this is the doctrine of double criminality.107 Second, the requesting state can only
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prosecute for the crime or crimes for which the extradition is sought; this is the doctrine of
specialty.108 Third, the requesting state must produce enough evidence to establish probable
cause that the fugitive committed the crime.109 Finally, a state must prove that the offense does
not fall into any exception for which a state can refuse extradition.
A.

Treaties & Capital Punishment
The United States would have to overcome various obstacles in order to obtain

extradition of Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda members. Absent a treaty, a state is under no
legal obligation to accommodate the United States by granting extradition. The next roadblock
is that the United States still has capital punishment. Finally, a state granting asylum to wanted
Al Qaeda members could claim that the offense is political in nature and therefore not
extraditable.
The United States has extradition treaties with roughly 106 countries.110 If Osama bin
Laden were found in any country without an extradition treaty, extraditing him would be very
difficult. Any of those states granting asylum has the right to refuse the United States’ request
for extradition. However, such a denial would not be an intelligent decision given that the
United States has made it clear that any state that provides asylum to any terrorist would suffer
the consequences. President George W. Bush stated, “[The United States] will pursue nations
that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism, [e]very nation in every region now has a decision to
make; either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”111 The Taliban regime refused the
United States’ demand to hand over bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members, for which the U.S.
attacked Afghanistan toppling the Taliban government. Thus, any state brazen enough to shelter
Bin Laden or any other terrorist by the means of refusing extradition would suffer harsh
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repercussions. This is not to say that the United States are willing to attack any country that
refuses to extradite, so long as the terrorists are brought to justice.
Any terrorist extradited to the United States to stand trial for their offense would, with
little doubt, face the death penalty. In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights held in
Soering v. United States112 that persons charged with capital offenses violated Article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“European Convention on Human Rights”).113 Article 3 states, “[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” In Soering, the European Court on
Human Rights found the lengthy stays and harsh death row conditions constituted “inhuman”
treatment or punishment.114 The Soering case is one of many in a growing trend that signatories
to the European Convention on Human Rights can refuse to extradite to the United States when
terrorists are facing the death penalty because extradition would violate Article 3 of the
Convention’s prevention of “inhuman” punishment and treatment.
B.

Political Offense Exception
The final obstacle the United States would have to hurdle is the political offense

exception to extradition. Most states can refuse to extradite for offenses that are political in
nature. Political offense has traditionally two meanings; first, there are “purely political”
offenses that are crimes aimed directly at the state, consequently there is no common crime;
second, there is a category of “relative political offense in which the political motivation behind
an otherwise common crime renders the act ‘political’.”115 There is not a universal excepted
definition as to what constitutes a political offense, however most courts agree when describing
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the elements.116 “The opinio juris conceives of ‘purely political’ offenses as acts against the
security of the state.”117 The crimes that fall into this category lack the essential characteristics
of the common crime, such as malice or personal gain.118 The intention of the person
committing the offense is to cause change in the political system, thereby hurting the state’s
political regime.119 However, no such agreement can be found in regards to “relative political”
offenses.120 The degree of political motivation required making a crime a political offense and
unextraditable depends on the application of the laws of the states.121 There are a number of
negative definitions of political offense.122 Extradition treaties sometimes use negative
definitions of political offense, in other words, the treaty will list specific crimes or offenses that
will not be considered political, such as war crimes, genocide, or certain acts of terrorism.123
Extradition requests are subject to interpretation by the judicial branch before the
executive branch renders the final decision.124 Four principles used for judicial interpretation
have emerged to determine whether an offense is a political offense: The Political Incident
Theory, The United States Approach, The Rights Injured Approach, and The Predominance
Approach.125
The Anglo-Saxon Approach: The Political Incident Theory is used primarily by the
British Courts to interpret what constitutes a political offense.126 This approach asserts that the
act must be “incidental to and form…part of the political disturbance” and the crimes must be “in
116
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furtherance” of the political disturbances.127 In Schtracks v. Government of Israel, the court held
that “the political offense must be connected with an uprising, disturbance, insurrection, civil
war, or struggle for power.”128 The theory is a subjective approach with little attention being
paid to the actual act.129 The test as it stands today is that a state may refuse to extradite if the
crime was incidental to and formed a part of a political disturbance.130
If Osama bin Laden or any Al Qaeda members were apprehended in a country that
interpreted the political offense under the Political Incidence Theory, could that state refuse to
extradite them to the United States? The court would pay little attention to the actual crime or
impact on the international community that is undoubtedly large. Was there a political uprising
by the group who the perpetrator belongs? An argument could be made that Al Qaeda is in a war
or struggle for power with the West as the political oppressor. The reason for the political
offense exception was the concerned with returning a political offender back to his or her
political advisories.131 If this argument can be made successfully, then the first prong has been
met. The second prong would be satisfied if the act were part of a larger political struggle.
Osama bin Laden’s terrorist activities have political undertones, but in his own words he called
for a “jihad,” which by definition is a “holy war,” not a political uprising. A court could find that
Osama bin Laden is at war with the United States, which is requesting extradition, is the political
adversary. It appears a court using the Political Incidence Theory could find that these were a
political offense and unextraditable.132
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The next interpretation of what constitutes a political offense is the United States
Approach. This model developed out of the Political Incidence Theory used by British Courts.133
“The two-part definition of the political offense, that the act must be committed in the course of,
and incidental to the political offense, a violent political disturbance, such as war, revolution, or
rebellion, has been mechanically applied.”134 The United States Courts have refused to inquire
into the motives behind the state requesting extradition.135 A court could deny extradition of Bin
Laden or Al Qaeda members because the acts could fit under this definition of political
offense.136
The French Test: The Rights Injured Approach is an objective test and considers an act
political only when the perpetrator’s acts “directly injure the rights of the state.”137 The act gains
political offense status by an injury to the state’s rights, not from the motive of the offender.138
“By this formulation, the French courts severely restrict the scope of the political offense
exception, limiting it to only ‘pure political’ acts and automatically excluding ‘relative political’
offense.”139 The focus then is on the injury to the United States and not the motive of Osama bin
Laden or Al Qaeda members. A “purely political” offense is an act directed at a state and there
is no element of a common crime.140 The attacks of September 11 could be considered a “purely
political” act. There was no element of financial gain or motive of malice; the intent was to
topple the United States as a political power. Thus, the terrorists act could be considered
political under the French Test: Rights Injured Approach and therefore unextraditable.
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The final theory in defining what constitutes a political offense is The Swiss Test: The
Predominance approach. The Swiss test includes the Political Incidence element of political
disturbance, but adds two additional elements.141 The Swiss test has three general requirements:
the act must be politically motivated; proportional to the political objective desired, and must be
incidental in a struggle for political power.142 If Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda members are
seized in a country that interprets the political offense under the Swiss Test, the inquiry would
start with the connection between the crime committed and the political purpose.143 The crimes
were committed to achieve a political end, that is the fall of Western values; more specifically
the fall of the United States. Thus, the first element appears to be met. The acts of September 11
need to be proportional to the political goal desired. bin Laden’s goal is to topple the U.S.
government and any Western ideologies. An argument can be made that his acts are proportional
to achieving that end; hence, the second prong could be satisfied. It could be argued that the act
was committed in a struggle for political power. The struggle for political power is with the
United States and its involvement in the middle east where bin Laden has stated that the U.S.
should pull out of the region altogether. If the United States requested extradition from a state
that applies the Swiss Test it appears that the state could refuse to extradite claiming that the
September 11 attacks on the U.S. were political in nature and unextraditable. However, “it is
unlikely in a situation other than one involving an escape from a totalitarian regime, that status of
a political crime would be attributed to terrorists acts under the Swiss test.”144
If a rigid application of the four theories on determining the definition of political
offense, then a state could refuse the United States request for extradition under any of the four
theories. However, most countries by convention or treaty have limited the political offense
141
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exception to extradition not to include certain acts of terrorism.145 While recent conventions on
terrorism require a party to extradite or punish the terrorist under its own laws. Justice will be
served, nevertheless the United States may have harsher laws than the state that refuses to
extradite and try them under its own laws pursuant to its right under the conventions. With more
than 3,000 lives lost and an estimated $36 Billion dollars146 in damages to New York alone, it
would be hard to imagine a state refusing extradition under the political offense exception.
VI.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

Starting in August of 1945, with the creation of the Nuremberg tribunal147 to prosecute
members of the Nazi party for war crimes committed during the Second World War, ad hoc
international tribunals were born. The second tribunal was formed in 1946 to prosecute Japanese
war criminals for their atrocities.148 After the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the United
Nations and the rest of the international community started inquiring about creating a permanent
international criminal court to prosecute grave breaches of the United Nations Charter.149 In
1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 260, discussing the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide.150 In the same resolution, a law commission was created

145

For an example see the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Hostage Convention, Hijacking
Convention, supra note 17. See also European Convention on Extradition, supra note 31.
146
Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport, Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York City,
available at http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/rsch_pap/2002/rp021112.html. “Adding up the earnings losses,
property damage, and cleanup costs, the authors estimate the direct damage of the attack on the World Trade Center
to be between $33 billion and $36 billion.”
147
See Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Concluded at London, 8 August
1945. Entered into force, 8 August 1945. 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
Recognized by the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 11 December 1946.
G.A. Res. 95, 1st Sess., at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
148
See Special Proclamation Establishing an International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, reprinted in The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 Apr. 46-12 Nov. 48, at III-Annex Nos. A-4 and A-5 (Amsterdam: APA
University Press, B. Rolling & C. Ruter eds. 1977).
149
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Overview, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm. Discussing the creation of the International Criminal Court.
150
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res., 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/260
(1948).

26

inquiring into an international criminal court.151 It would be over fifty years before a U.N.
created international criminal tribunal would reappear.152 The United Nations in 1993, adopted
resolution 827 creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) to
prosecute crimes committed during the civil war of that country.153 In 1994, the United Nations
passed another resolution, 955, to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) to prosecute war crimes in Rwanda.154 Finally, in 1998, the Rome Statute was set for
signatures, which would create a permanent International Criminal Court.155
The United Nations has the power to extend jurisdiction of either the ICTY or the ICTR
to include offenders of 9/11 and international terrorists. The recently created ICC’s subject
matter jurisdiction could be extended to hear cases of international terrorism. The United
Nations pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter156 has the power to create an ad hoc tribunal
to try alleged terrorists. Thus, the question that is presented is whether any of the international
tribunals would be an appropriate place to prosecute Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda
members who are apprehended.
A.

Jurisdiction of an International Tribunal
Jurisdiction of an international tribunal under the general principles of extraterritorial

jurisdiction would be satisfied pursuant to three of the five principles. The United Nations, when
it created the ICTY and the ICTR, limited the courts jurisdiction to crimes committed in the
respective countries. The international tribunals would have jurisdiction based on the territorial
principle because the courts specifically have power to adjudicate crimes committed in the
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The protective principle can be satisfied based not on an injury
to a state’s interests, but rather an injury to the world as a whole. In other words, the United
Nations’ purposes are “the maintenance of international peace and security,” thus it is a
international interests being protecting by conferring jurisdiction to an international tribunal.157
The U.N. instructs the ad hoc tribunals to hear only the most serious crimes; for example, the
ICTY was created to combat genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
violations of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity.158 These crimes are all serious
violations of international law, and are accepted as universal crimes punishable by any state that
apprehends an offender. Hence, the international ad hoc tribunals satisfy the universal principle
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
B.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
The ICTY was created by the United Nations to combat atrocities committed during the

civil war in Yugoslavia.159 It is located at Hague in the Netherlands.160 Its purpose is to
prosecute persons for humanitarian rights violations during the war, deter further crimes in the
unstable country, and continue the restoration of peace to the former Yugoslavia.161 The tribunal
has subject matter jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions162,
violations of the laws or customs of war163, genocide164, and crimes against humanity.165
Jurisdiction is limited by geography as well as time.166 The jurisdiction is only over crimes
committed in Yugoslavia since 1991.167 Personal jurisdiction is over persons only, and not
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organizations, political parties, or corporations.168 The ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction with
national courts; however, the ICTY can claim primacy over the national courts.169
As the ICTY stands today, it does not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction over
Osama bin Laden or any other Al Qaeda member unless they commit a crime in the former
Yugoslavia. The ICTY has limited jurisdiction over crimes committed since 1991, but only
crimes that are committed in Yugoslavia. The United Nations could extend by resolution the
jurisdiction of the ICTY to hear cases concerning crimes committed by Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda members since the Security Council has already determine the attacks on September 11 to
be breaches of the Charter to the United Nations.170 It appears that the U.N. would not be willing
to extend the ICTY’s jurisdiction. There is a possibility of “tribunal fatigue” from hearing to
many cases and be “reluctant to incur the political difficulties and expense of providing
international prosecution in a situation where so many avenues for national prosecution are
readily available.171 The ICTY has tired only 31 defendants in eight years at a cost of $400
million dollars.172 It is also unlikely that the U.N. would extend jurisdiction for the acts of a
single day, no matter how atrocious, and would not embrace a broader category of international
terrorism to be prosecuted.173 Therefore, it would seem unlikely that the United Nations would
extend jurisdiction to the ICTY to adjudicate the terrorist acts committed on September 11.
C.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations created the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.174 “The purpose [of the ICTR] was to contribute to
the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace in the region,
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replacing an existing culture of impunity with one of accountability.”175 As with the ICTY, the
U.N. limited the ICTR’s jurisdiction geographically and by reference to when the crimes took
place.176 The ad hoc tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes that were committed between
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.177 The ITCR was developed to prosecute the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions that occurred in 1994 in the country of Rwanda.178 As with the extension of
jurisdiction of the ICTY, the United Nations could extend the jurisdiction of the ICTR to
prosecute the terrorist responsible for the attacks on the United States on the 11 of September.
As noted under the discussion on the ICTY, it would be unlikely that the U.N. would go through
the trouble of complicating the ICTR jurisdictional responsibilities. Consequently, the ICTR
would not be a likely place to prosecute Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda members for the
terrorist acts committed on 9/11.
D.

International Criminal Court
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was

entered into force.179 The ICC is a permanent tribunal located in Hague, the Netherlands, and
“shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern.”180 The Court has jurisdiction provided under the Rome Statute to
prosecute the crime of genocide181, crimes against humanity182, war crimes183, and the crime of
aggression.184 Any state that becomes party to the Rome Statute accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction

175

Tribunal at a Glance, available at http://www.ictr.org/.
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
See Rome Statute, supra note 155. For a list of signatories, and parties that have ratified available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp.
180
Rome Statute Art. 1, supra note 155.
181
Rome Statute Art. 5(1)(a), supra note 155. Article 6 defines the crime of genocide.
182
Rome Statute Art. 5(1)(b), supra note 155. Article 7 defines crimes against humanity.
183
Rome Statute Art. 5(1)(c), supra note 155. Article 8 defines war crimes.
184
Rome Statute Art. 5(1)(d), supra note 155. Crimes of aggression are not defined in the Rome Statute.
176

30

with respect to the crimes triable.185 As it stands today, the Rome Statute does not have an
explicit provision against terrorism. However, the attacks on 9/11 could fit into three of the four
classes of crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. The exact
parameters will not be determined until all parties ratify the Rome Statute, which is open for
ratification until June 30, 2004.
As of July 1, 2002, 139 countries have signed the Rome Statute, and 84 are actually parties.186
The ICC suffered a severe blow when the United States, who signed the Rome Statute on the last possible
day, issued a statement that it did not intend to be bound by its signature. On May 6, 2002, the United
States informed the Security-General “that the United States does not intend to become a party to the
treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31,
2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be
reflected in the depositary's status lists relating to this treaty." In addition, the jurisdiction of the ICC is
not retroactive, which means that the court could not hear any crimes committed before July 1, 2002, the
187

day the Rome Statute entered into force.

E.

Advantages: International Tribunal
Prosecuting Osama bin Laden in an international forum has some advantages. The final

verdict may be more internationally accepted than if the suspected terrorists were tried under a
secret military tribunal in the United States. Islamic countries may be more likely to turnover
suspected terrorists to an international ad hoc tribunal then to extradite to the United States.188
European countries that are party to the European Convention on Human Rights189 would be less
hesitant to hand over custody to an international forum that does not rely on death as a possible
sentence, as opposed to the United States in both domestic and the proposed military tribunals.
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A “global court” would use internationally agreed upon standards of evidence for violations of
national and international law.190 It is argued that an international tribunal would contain Islamic
jurists and would give them an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the Islamic faith
does not condemn the acts of September 11.191 The prosecution in an international tribunal
would alleviate some of the caseload for United States District Courts or U.S. military
commissions.192 Finally, the United Nations has experience in creating ad hoc tribunals and has
the wherewithal to instill proper and internationally accepted procedures and punishments.
F. Disadvantages: International Tribunals
There are disadvantages in prosecuting Osama bin Laden in an internationally created ad
hoc tribunal. The ad hoc international tribunals can seldom be classified as an efficient and
expedient form of justice. For example, in the ICTY, it took seven years just to indict Slobodan
Milosevic.193 Even with all of the conventions, treaties, and law enacted, there is not agreed
upon definition of what constitutes international terrorism. A state may refuse to extradite or
conceal an alleged offender from an international forum.194 “[Osama] bin Laden’s sympathizers
would probably view [an international] tribunal as many Serbs view the United Nationssponsored, multi-ethnic international tribunal at The Hague: as a biased tool of western
power.”195 Prosecuting in an international tribunal would not bring any credibility to the
proceedings, especially to those to see bin Laden as a victim. A trial before an international
forum could act as a “springboard for bin Laden and his associates to portray themselves as
martyrs.”196 University of Chicago Law professors Jack Goldsmith and Bernard Meltzer state:
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[s]uch a trial would ... enhance Mr. bin Laden's stature and appeal. He and other terrorists
would use the event as a platform to attack the US's culture, motives and policies--an
attack that would reverberate throughout the Muslim world. Any dissent from a guilty
verdict would weaken the judgment's legitimacy and ... increase the terrorists' power and
prestige. Acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence would ... be possible, especially if
protection of intelligence sources precluded the presentation of evidence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States District Courts, U.S. military commissions, and an international
tribunal all potentially have valid personal and subject matter jurisdiction over Osama bin Laden
and Al Qaeda terrorists for the acts perpetrated in the U.S. on the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and Pennsylvania. An analysis of the five general principles of international
extraterritorial jurisdiction demonstrates that all proposed tribunals have jurisdiction based on
one or more of the principles. Specific jurisdiction in United States military tribunals and courts
can be found in the United States Constitution or specifically designated within the statute. For
international tribunals, specific jurisdiction is conferred via statute and restricted to specific
crimes committed in a specific territory. Jurisdiction is valid, but is it proper? Justice is a vague
and ambiguous concept not easily defined. The question of appropriateness in the sense of
fulfilling justice as an end is charged with political and moral quandaries. Most arguments are
based on political objectives and notions of equity.
Prosecuting Osama bin Laden and other suspected Al Qaeda terrorists in United States
Federal courts, U.S. led military commission under President Bush’s Military Order, or in ad hoc
international tribunals, existing or created all have numerous advantages. However, all of the
proposed forums have equally as many disadvantages. Consequently, selecting one forum as an
appropriate means to administer justice is nearly impossible. Appropriateness ultimately
depends on one’s political and or moral objectives. In the United States, appropriate
administration of justice for most would be nothing less than death for all those involved in the
attacks. The terrorists massacred over three thousand innocent lives on September 11; we, the
people of the United States are obligated to take their lives. However, such a narrow objective
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blinds the United States to its very foundation. The U.S. Constitution is based on notions of
liberty, inalienable rights, and due process. The United States political machine acting in blind
rage would disregard these fundamental guarantees. Other countries and entities in the
international community would deem any forum without capital punishment as the only
appropriate forums. Most industrialized nations prohibit the death penalty. The world consists
of people of diverse cultures and beliefs governed by equally diverse governments. An across
the board consensus of what constitutes an appropriate forum to administer justice cannot
possibly be found. Condemnation of the horrific attacks on September 11 seems to be where the
agreement between cultures and nations ends.
Extradition of suspected terrorists is a major obstacle blocking prosecution in the United
States forums and in international tribunals. The political offense exception could be used to
block extradition. The political offense is interpreted by different theories, all leading to the
conclusion that extradition could be blocked for the attacks on September 11, contrary to any
conventions or treaties stating otherwise. Conventions and treaties have employed negative
definitions which act to limit what will be covered by the political offense exception. For
example, the Convention on Hostage takings specifically orders parties to the convention to
extradite or prosecute the suspects in its domestic system, thus limiting hostage taking from the
political offense exception. The next hurdle to extradition is capital punishment. European
countries have concluded that capital punishment violates the European Convention on Human
rights, consequently extradition is inappropriate in cases were it is a possibility, thus extradition
would be very difficult.
The appropriate and most effective means to administer justice to Osama bin Laden and
suspected 9/11 terrorists is to prosecute them in countries where they are apprehended. This
solution would nullify the damaging affects of extradition. A request and denial of extradition
has an adverse impact on relations between the two States. The tension could lead to splintering
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of the international community, where a united front is enormously important. Allowing States
to try terrorists individually would also place terrorists on notice that any crime committed will
be punished by whatever country apprehends them. A global effort to eradicate terrorism
country by country would be the most sufficient and efficient means of justice. The world
should ban together on a single front to combat the atrocities committed on September 11 and
beyond. This approach would not completely deny the United States from administering justice
to bin Laden and suspected Al Qaeda members because any terrorist apprehended by the U.S.
could be tried in Federal District courts. However, the United States, more specifically President
Bush, would not likely stand idly by while a foreign state prosecutes Osama bin Laden or other
suspected terrorists in its domestic courts since the United States has a substantial interest in
administering justice for the atrocities committed September 11, 2001.
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